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Compulsory Audit of Corporations
*
By Frederick B. Andrews
After the full fury of the great war had struck, and the peoples
of the world found themselves enmeshed in a struggle whose
origins they did not understand, there arose the determination
that out of that war should come an end of war. Among the
various methods proposed to that end, perhaps none was more
cogently expressed than the demand that agreements between
nations should be “open covenants, openly arrived at.” Al
though subject to manifest limitations, the idea had a force which
excused even a schoolmaster president for using “ a preposition to
end a sentence with.” It has never been completely ignored
since then; it will never be completely ignored hereafter.
No better understood than the ultimate causes of the world
war have been those of the world-wide business depression of the
past three years. But even an uncomprehending world realizes
that those supposed safeguards on which it had been taught to
rely have not sufficed to protect multitudes of innocent investors
from heavy losses. From the confusing minutiae of individual
complaints, one of the few common cries has been, “ If I had only
known.” To be sure, this might have meant merely a change
in the life-boat personnel; but even after making full allowance
for those who will go to sea in any craft, it seems reasonable that
an accurate knowledge of the vessel’s condition would have pre
vented her sailing, or at least would have brought her into an
emergency port, crippled perhaps but still afloat and with her
passenger list intact. Before dropping this metaphor I should,
perhaps, apologize to that majestic maritime tradition which
requires the captain to go down with his ship unless the safety of
all others is assured; such a tradition in finance would go far
toward reducing the risk of non-managing investors.
Similar to that demand for open covenants openly arrived at is
the demand for compulsory audit of corporations. This demand
should be considered carefully by three large groups—by manage
ment, because it is aimed directly at sins of management; by
stockholders and creditors, because it promises them protection
* An address delivered at the annual meeting of the American Institute of Accountants,
Kansas City, Missouri, October 19, 1932.
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and they must meet its cost; by professional accountants, because
its implications lay on their shoulders a tremendous burden of
responsibility, and because it involves for them a huge amount
of work.
Not all, by any means, of the ills revealed by the current de
pression may be charged to the absence of audit, and it would be
unwise to lead investors into the belief that an audit will com
pletely safeguard their investments. Hatry under the English
compulsory audit system, Insull under the American voluntary
audit system, Kreuger under no audit system, hundreds of banks
under the scrutiny of federal or state examiners—how do they
differ in the eyes of ruined investors and depositors? All failures,
and present in each case a curtain of secrecy successfully veiling,
regardless of audit, the scandalous misuse of funds which made
collapse inevitable when the strain should come. Remove that cur
tain, remove with it the myth of the super-man, and give the power
ful restraining force of public opinion a chance to operate. This
is the essence of the demand for compulsory audit of corpora
tions.
Corporations conduct practically all business of consequence in
this country, and the corporate form of organization not only
permits but in large enterprises necessitates the complete separa
tion of ownership from management. The demand for com
pulsory audit, then, seems to mean that wherever in a business
enterprise ownership and management are divorced, management
must submit to independent scrutiny, with the results of that
scrutiny reported directly and intelligibly to ownership. If this
interpretation is correct, then the term corporation must, for the
purposes of this discussion, be both enlarged and abridged. It
must be enlarged so as to include all publicly-financed enterprises
even though unincorporated; and it must be abridged so as to
exclude incorporated enterprises where ownership and manage
ment rest in the same persons. Further, the term ownership
must be understood to include not only stockholders but also
bondholders and other substantial creditors.
There are four large groups of corporations already subject to
intensive scrutiny by federal or state authorities, namely, rail
roads, insurance companies, public utilities and banking and
building and loan institutions. Shall there be compulsory audits
of these corporations, specifically for the information and pro
tection of their security-holders?
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I believe that railroads do not generally employ independent
auditors for the purpose which we have in mind. A considerable
part of the vast array of statistics required of them by the Interstate Commerce Commission is published, and since these are
largely verified by auditors for the commission it may be said that
we already have for the railroads what is sought under the name
of compulsory audit of corporations.
Insurance and public-utility companies in increasing numbers
are publishing statements certified by independent auditors; but
these auditors are appointed and paid by management, and in
some cases, particularly with reference to large utility holding
companies, their statements have not even remotely resembled an
intelligible exposition of corporate affairs. Even before the
Insull crash became first a probability and then an actuality,
there were not wanting voices crying in the wilderness, demanding
“more light and power too” and urging utility magnates to
repent and to prepare the way of the Lord. Now the silver
cord is loosed, and the golden bowl has been broken; small
wonder, then, that John Baptist, who today retains his head
regardless of how it cerebrates, is sometimes heard to say, “I
told you so.”
Probably no group of corporations has done more to bring about
audit of others, or would more strenuously resist compulsory audit
of their own accounts, than banking corporations. Probably also
no group is more justified than well-managed banking corporations
in the contention that an audit of their accounts is unnecessary.
However, since no one is required to prove himself a banker in
order to engage in banking (or, at least, in some activity under
that name) the number of well-managed banking corporations is
not so great a proportion of the total number as could be desired.
Amazing embezzlements by bank employes, and criminal prosecu
tions of “banksters” on charges of conspiracy to defraud their
depositors, give a sickly color to that scrutiny of banking corpora
tions already imposed by law. This pallor is like that of grass
growing beneath a board, and simple heliotherapy is the indicated
treatment.
Excepting possibly the railroads, then, I see no reason for ex
cluding from the compulsion for audit any of these groups of
already-publicly-regulated corporations.
It is no news that every one that doeth evil hateth the light,
lest his deeds should be reproved, but he that doeth truth cometh
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to the light. It will be said that this light will inform com
petitors, to the detriment of management and to the ultimate
injury of ownership. This argument was urged against the
income-tax amendment, but after twenty years it is heard only
from the lips of those citizens whom the income-tax laws have
compelled to suspend, temporarily at least, their business activi
ties. I have had occasion to observe a night watchman in the
vicinity of my home, throwing a beam of light from an electric
torch into the shadows under shrubbery and in the corners of
garages. Considering his physique, I have suspected that if
confronted by a semi-senior, or even a junior, footpad this pro
tector of the peace would have to call a cop. Nevertheless, there
is a protection there—that beam of light is more to be feared by
the wrong-doer than is the man who wields it. Let us have light
—at least enough light so that ownership may know what is
being done with its property. If certain operations can not stand
publicity, how can we be so certain that they are truly for the best
interests of ownership? Officers of banks and holding companies
who know that the details of their portfolios will be published,
corporate executives who know that their stockholders will be
fully informed of their acts, will be powerfully moved to establish
supportable policies the soundness of which will be revealed by
audit. Thus the entire body of ownership, not merely those
persons who are astute enough to read between the lines of obscure
or equivocastatements, will be benefited.
I submit that the most damaging feature of the current depres
sion has not been the financial loss which it has brought to millions
of our citizens. A nationwide drought or similar catastrophe of
nature or an armed invasion from beyond our shores might have
entailed even greater financial losses and done less damage. The
worst damage has been that inflicted on our business morale by
the wholesale betrayal of the confidence of investors. That
confidence must be restored. There must be assurance that
management of all publicly-financed enterprises will function in
the light of publicity—pitiless publicity if necessary.
Each of us has at some time declaimed with sophomoric fervor
the gentle answer made by Portia to Shylock’s arrogant demand,
“By what compulsion must I? Tell me that.” But moral
suasion failed Portia, and she had to find a compulsion which
served. When moral suasion fails the management-employed
auditor, he must do likewise. By what compulsion, then, can an
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arrogant management be forced to submit to effective audit—
that is, an audit not only effective in itself but also given effective
publicity?
The corporation is a creature of the state, from which it derives
its existence and all of its powers, privileges and immunities.
The unquestionable preponderance of honesty on the part of
corporate management and the tremendous value of the corporate
form of organization require that some means be devised for
curbing abuses of corporate powers. If compulsory audit is the
remedy for those abuses, the state is amply justified in applying
it to all corporations alike. This has been done in at least three
jurisdictions.
In England every corporation is required to furnish to its stock
holders two weeks before their annual meeting a current balancesheet, accompanied by an auditor’s certificate that it does or that
it does not exhibit a correct view of the company’s affairs. No
form for this balance-sheet is prescribed; it is not even prepared
by the auditor—the company submits the balance-sheet and the
auditor merely tells what he thinks of it. The auditor is not per
mitted to be a director, officer or employe of the company. His
qualifications are not specified, but he is almost invariably a
chartered accountant. He is appointed in the first instance by
the directors, and thereafter elected by the stockholders annually.
None but the retiring auditor may be so elected except after notice
of intention to nominate another, with the result that the auditor
originally appointed by the directors (generally on recommenda
tion of the officers) is most apt to be continued in office unless he
makes himself emphatically objectionable to the stockholders.
He has the right of access to whatever records he considers perti
nent, and he must give an unequivocal certificate. He has the
right to attend any general meeting at which the accounts are to
be considered and there to make such statements or explanations
about the accounts as he may desire. This includes, of course, the
meeting at which the auditor for the ensuing year is to be elected.
In Germany every corporation is required to furnish to its
stockholders, at or before their annual meeting, a current balancesheet and statement of income, the form of which is prescribed in
considerable detail. These statements must be accompanied by
an auditor’s certificate to the effect, not only that the statements
themselves are correctly prepared and in agreement with the
books, but that all statutory requirements relative to corporation
355

The Journal of Accountancy -

accounts have been observed. The auditor is not permitted to
be a director, officer or employe of the company nor in any way
under obligation to it, and he must be a person qualified in ac
counting. He is elected by the stockholders, although actually
engaged by the officers. If the directors, the officers, or the hold
ers of so much as ten per cent of the stock object to the auditor so
elected, the matter is referred to local courts for final selection.
In addition to certifying the published statements, the auditor is
required to render a written report on the audit and the directors
are required to take cognizance of such report and to inform the
stockholders of any important exceptions noted by the auditor.
The auditor is liable in damages to the company for the divulging
of trade secrets and also in damages of not more than 100,000
marks for negligence; that term, however, is not defined. The
auditor is subject to punishment by both imprisonment and fine
for making a false representation in his report or for concealing
important facts.
Coming to this country, we find that in Massachusetts every
corporation is required to file annually with the commissioner of
corporations a statement of condition which includes a balancesheet conforming substantially to a form prescribed by statute.
In the case of a corporation having a capital stock of $100,000
or more, or 1,000 or more shares of no-par-value stock, this
balance-sheet must be accompanied by an auditor’s affidavit that
it represents the true condition of the affairs of said corporation as
disclosed by its books. The auditor is not permitted to be an
officer of the corporation. His qualifications are not specified but
he is generally a certified public accountant. He is appointed by
a committee of three selected by the stockholders from their own
number, and no director may be a member of this committee.
He is sworn to the faithful performance of his duties but these are
not prescribed and are presumably determined by his own judg
ment. While the statement of condition and all accompanying
statements filed with the commissioner become public documents,
there is no statutory requirement that copies be furnished direct
to stockholders nor any provision that the auditor, in his official
capacity as such, may attend stockholders’ meetings to explain or
comment on the accounts.
Although satisfactory statutory compulsion in the United
States may be difficult to secure, because of the many separate
sovereignties, the ineptness of legislators when dealing with so
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highly technical a subject and the very large number of corpora
tions as to which there is no apparent public need for auditing,
still it is not impossible.
As to this third difficulty, the so-called close corporation, I
suggest a provision permitting the waiver of audit on written
consent of the holders of all or substantially all of the capital
stock entitled to vote at the annual meeting. Proxy action on
this subject should be barred. Creditors or holders of non-voting
stock having an interest equal to, say, ten per cent or more of the
par or stated value of the voting stock should be given power to
veto this waiver by appropriate application to the regulating
authorities.
The first of the dangers apt to arise from the ineptness of legis
lators is in fixing the qualifications of the auditor. In New York,
for instance, a bill was introduced last year which, if it had been
passed, would have required enterprises of a certain character to
be audited by certified public accountants. Since New York does
not permit the holders of this title from other states to apply it to
themselves in New York, a specification so apparently praise
worthy would in fact bar from the proposed work many persons
peculiarly fitted to perform it. Thus in states where accountants
are not at present subject to statutory regulation or licensing,
such a provision would amount to exactly that, and such regulation
should be approached and considered under its own name. Cer
tainly no barrier should be erected at any state line or else
where which might prevent a competent person from serving as
corporation auditor. Of this sort of thing we have too much
already.
The second danger would show itself when the legislators under
took to prescribe an audit procedure or the form in which the
resulting statements should be set up and their accompanying
certificates phrased. If any such provision is to be included in
the statute, the advice and assistance of accountants in its drafting
will be indispensable, and the good intentions of legislators who
regard such drafting as their job must not be allowed to vitiate
the whole measure, as good intentions so frequently do.
At least substantial uniformity among the various states is
imperative if confusion is not to be worse confounded. The scan
dalous seductiveness by which a few of our states already lure
corporations away from their natural homes, to the enrichment of
those states and with possibilities of danger to investors every
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where, must not be enhanced. Any state imposing compulsory
audit on its own corporations should also amend its “blue sky”
law to forbid the distribution within its borders of securities of
foreign corporations not subject to equally strict audit. This
would be necessary as a protection for the securities of its own
companies.
This uniformity is not impossible of attainment. The National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has, during
the past forty years, recommended for adoption by the states a
total of fifty laws, of which two have been enacted by all the
states and at least sixteen by one-third or more; only four have
failed of adoption somewhere, and these were all recommended
within the past six years. This conference, composed of com
missioners appointed by the various governors and by the presi
dent, accepts the cooperation of committees on uniform state
laws from the American and the various state bar associations.
Surely a uniform compulsory-audit-of-corporations act would
surpass many of the fifty and might be held to equal the uniform
bills-of-lading, warehouse receipts and negotiable-instruments
acts. The same machinery which put those acts on the statute
books of so many states is still available, and I submit that the
American Institute of Accountants would be doing a real public
service by engaging the attention of the American Bar Associa
tion for this reform and by appointing a committee to work on
this subject with the association’s committee on uniform state
laws. I believe the association’s attitude would be found
friendly, and while the necessary thoroughness of the work would
perhaps chafe the impatient, still the likelihood of the effective
ness would be greater than could be hoped for from independent
and non-correlated action in the separate states.
Some advantages are claimed for the proposal to have this
compulsion imposed, not by the state as a price for corporate
existence, but by the various stock exchanges as a price for the
privilege of listing, as is already done to a limited extent. Such a
requirement would reach the great majority of publicly-financed
enterprises, and at the same time avoid a sudden and perhaps
insupportable accession of work for the accounting profession.
Its framers might reasonably be presumed to have a greater
knowledge of what is needed and to be to a much greater degree
than any group of legislators free from political influences. Uni
formity might be achieved among the various exchanges much
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more easily than among the various state legislatures, and readily
available co-operation with accountants’ organizations would
facilitate the maintenance of proper standards of disclosure in the
auditors’ reports.
It may well be asked, however, whether the stock exchanges
have not already waited too long to adopt this reform. Their
objective being a free market, they have ever done reverence to
the doctrine of caveat emptor. The essence of the demand for
compulsory audit of corporations is caveat vendor, a doctrine
which has grown in favor tremendously since the days of Dr.
Wiley’s heroic fight for the pure-food-and-drugs act. Rightly or
wrongly, the exchanges, being composed of brokers directly bene
fited by a large volume of trading irrespective of the relation be
tween market and actual values, are generally viewed as having
been parties to the lamb-shearings of all decades. Compulsion
adopted by them for the audit of companies listing securities on
their boards, if insuring adequate publicity for the results ob
tained, would be very effective, but it would neither satisfy nor
silence the demand we have noted.
We are left, then, with the question, what kind of audit? A
double-barreled question, going alike to the character of the
investigation and the character of the resulting report. It is
important that, as to the first “barrel,” no legislature should
undertake the answer without the advice and assistance of the
accounting profession. The result of such an effort, at its best,
might be capable of being followed in actual audit practice, but
it would almost inevitably permit of literal observance attended
by complete lack of the desired results. It is impossible for the
average legislature to arrive at a wise solution of questions that
involve a knowledge of highly technical principles. Only an ex
perienced auditor knows what must be done, and—more impor
tant still—what may safely be left undone, in attempting to
discover from accounts and other records the true financial posi
tion of a corporation large enough to command a real public
interest.
The brochure published by the Federal Reserve Board in 1929
under the title Verification of Financial Statements was the
fruit of years of hard work by a committee of this Institute
comprising some of the best brains of the profession; and it
is a work of which they, and we vicariously, may well be
proud. It sets up a standard which certainly must be met
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in any audit, for the purpose indicated, worthy of the name.
Every member of the profession is charged with knowledge
of it and, although he may accomplish his purpose by some
other adequate method, he is without justification if by ignor
ing the procedure there outlined he fails to discover any serious
error which would have been discovered by following this stand
ard procedure.
This booklet, then, affords an excellent basis for whatever
statutory provision may be worked out to specify audit procedure.
The work of adapting it to that purpose should be done very care
fully by the agencies I have indicated as best qualified to draft
such a statute.
I submit that one of the most serious, if not the most serious,
of the questions confronting our profession today is the character
of the financial statements given to ownership over the auditor’s
signature. Shall we remember that truth lies as much in the
ear of the hearer as in the mouth of the speaker, and certify only
such statements as we consider not merely technically accurate
but also reasonably safe against being misunderstood? Or shall
we adhere to the doctrine of caveat emptor and consider our full
duty done when our statements are so drawn that criticism may
be answered by pointing to some obscure words of qualification?
The time to determine this is not when we are confronted with
a difficult decision, when we are urged by a trusted management
to minimize untoward appearances, and when the voice of owner
ship can not reach our ear.
Whom do we serve? Not alone management, to the possible
concealment of its failures, its indiscretions, or worse; not alone
a dissatisfied portion of ownership seeking an excuse for embar
rassing an honest management. We must serve, or forfeit our
right to serve at all, the whole structure, ownership and manage
ment alike. The lens does not concern itself with the kind of
light rays presenting themselves for passage; it takes such as
come, brings them into proper focus, and presents a true image.
Such is the function of the auditor.
I am proud to be a member of a profession embracing so many
practitioners as does American accountancy who have, when nec
essary, unhesitatingly accepted the unhappy role of Policeman
Day, calling their erring clients back from the City of Night, and
have insisted on full disclosure of all pertinent facts to those
entitled to knowledge. In countless instances, with no applaud360
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ing audience, they have done this even to the point of alienating
clients who represent their livelihood, knowing full well that
others are standing by ready and willing to extend the accommo
dation they refuse.
This makes the problem sound very simple. Brand the shys
ters for what they are, and let the world look to us, the lily whites,
the very elect, for the real, the genuine, full disclosure. Not for
us the misstatement or omission of essential fact. This is a
monster we abhor, which to be hated needs but to be seen. But
pause a moment—there need be no misstatement, no omission;
management deftly shades the light a bit, perhaps suggests a
footnote (set in small type, true enough, and difficult to read)
which may be made an inseparable part of the statement which
is certainly there for any reader to see; and we may come to view
ourselves not as concealing or misstating, but as serving the esti
mable purpose of avoiding dissension and making smooth the
path of the footsore. There remains full disclosure, but in that
subdued and seductive light which does so much to soothe and so
little to disturb. And seen too oft, familiar with her face . . .
Let me be specific.
Recently a certain company issued to its stockholders a report
containing a balance-sheet, an income account and an analysis of
surplus, all duly certified. On the assets side of the balance-sheet,
7% of the total represented current assets; 81% represented
securities of other companies, some wholly owned and some of the
others owned to the extent at least of voting control; and 12%
represented obligations of certain of these controlled companies.
On the liabilities side, 1% represented current liabilities, 1% re
serves, 31% capital stock, 58% capital surplus and 9% earned
surplus. Not even all of this information appeared on the face of
the balance-sheet, for the extent of ownership represented by the
securities mentioned was ascertainable only from an incomplete
list three pages removed from the balance-sheet.
The balance-sheet itself was set in clear bold type, but beneath
it were some lengthy footnotes set in very small type, readable
only with difficulty, and understandable only by dint of real
concentration. From these footnotes it could be ascertained that
the market value of the securities mentioned was equal to only
21% of the value at which they were included among the assets—
in other words, that of the total asset values listed on the balancesheet, 64% was in fact non-existent. There was no consolidated
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balance-sheet, nor any balance-sheet of a wholly owned or a con
trolled subsidiary.
It was also only from these footnotes, and that by a long arith
metical calculation, that the single capital stock figure could be
analyzed to show its application separately to the two classes of
preferred stock and the common. This done, it appeared that the
common-stock equity, against which of course there would be
chargeable the asset-value shrinkage of 64%, was only 70% of
the total.
Nowhere was there any information as to the origin of the
capital surplus. From outside sources I was able to ascertain
that at least three-fourths of this capital surplus represented the
excess of the amount received for common stock over the amount
of the par value of that stock at the date of this balance-sheet;
about half of this excess represented a transfer to capital surplus
resulting from a reduction of the par value of the outstanding
common stock. Now the 64% shrinkage I have mentioned was
much more than sufficient to wipe out all of the earned surplus
plus one-fourth of the capital surplus, so that in fact the com
pany’s paid-in capital was impaired at the date of the balancesheet. I have no doubt that all this is perfectly legal; but I
submit that investors are entitled to clear information on these
facts somewhat in advance of such investigations as are now being
made of the Insull companies by federal and state authorities.
The income account showed a net income, after providing for
preferred stock dividends, equal to 36% on the par value of the
common stock. But from another small-type footnote it ap
peared that during the year losses on securities sold had been
charged against capital surplus in amounts equal to 34% of the
common stock par value, and that this same capital surplus had
been charged further with about 165% of the common stock par
value in order to effect a necessary write-down of the book value
of securities of companies in which the reporting company did
not have voting control.
Thus the common stockholders are told in stentorian tones that
their stock is earning a handsome rate of income and that their
asset equity amounts to hundreds of millions of dollars, after
which it is whispered to those close enough to hear that this equity
has shrunk to less than one-tenth of that sum and that the earn
ings have been wiped out by losses. O, Full Disclosure, what
crimes are committed in thy name!
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Turning the page we come to the auditors’ certificate, which
states that in their opinion the accompanying balance-sheet,
statement of income and analysis of surplus correctly set forth,
respectively, the financial condition of the company, the results of
operations for the year and the changes in surplus for a small part
of the year. So might a physician submit to a patient a drop of
blood, saying that it correctly reflects certain phases of the
patient’s physical condition; for truly it does, but only to the
trained expert aided by a microscope.
What was this common stock worth at the date of this balancesheet? Its book value was 1,590% of par, and its liquidating
value 160%. Its net income, presumably consisting chiefly of
dividends on stocks owned or service charges against controlled
companies, and therefore highly uncertain of continuance, was
36% of par, before considering the losses (equal to nearly 200%
of par) charged to capital surplus for reasons not stated. Leaving
my question unanswered—for, of course, there can be no precise
answer—let me tell what happened to the market prices. During
the week preceding the publication of this balance-sheet about
1½% of the outstanding common stock of this company changed
hands at an average price of approximately 180% of par; during
the next five weeks, more than 40% was sold at prices running up
to 960% of par, or six times its liquidating value and more than
twenty-six times its indicated earning power. And this was not in
1928, or in 1929—it was in the third year of the Great Depression.
During many years now it has been my privilege and my
pleasure to have a personal acquaintance with some, at least, of
the partners of the firm whose name was signed to the certificate I
have mentioned. I should resent and resist with all the vehe
mence at my command any insinuation against their ability or
their integrity. I surmise that in order to secure the publication
of the footnotes, from which I found it possible to calculate the
company’s situation as being radically different from that indi
cated by the statements standing alone, they had to stand up in
vigorous opposition to the management. I am convinced that
such disclosure as they made represents the utmost to which they
could win over the management. Nevertheless, it is by no means
impossible that during the five-week period when trading in this
common stock became a spectacular feature of the exchange where
it was listed, many persons relying on these balance-sheet figures
and this audit certificate, but incapable of understanding the full
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import of the footnotes, bought the stock at prices aggregating
many millions of dollars in excess of what the company’s officers
and the company’s auditors knew it to be worth at the date of the
balance-sheet. If this should prove to be the fact, we ought to
view with genuine alarm the defense that these financial state
ments, because of the qualifying footnotes, really gave that full
disclosure of facts to which we all so eagerly render lip service.
Why should it be so difficult for the honest and capable auditor
to perform what is not only his duty but his desire and make a
genuinely adequate disclosure in his certified statements? What
would have happened if the auditors in this case had firmly in
sisted that the figures in the statements themselves should be
adjusted to show the facts, which instead were recited in narrative
form in the footnotes? My guess is simply this: Their status
would have changed from auditors to ex-auditors, and the world
would never have known why. Furthermore, in all probability,
the world would never have learned about this company’s condi
tion even so little as was here presented in footnote form.
It is in this last statement that there lies whatever of justifica
tion the auditor may have. For myself it is not enough, because
I believe that the readers of the report in ninety-nine cases out of
a hundred do not study those footnotes—in fact, they probably
do not understand even the statements any too well; but they do
know and respect the auditors’ reputation, and reading the un
qualified certificate they assume that all is well with the company.
I can not deny, however, that there is merit in the proposition
that half a loaf is better than none, and that the footnotes will
enlighten at least some of the readers, who may do some preaching
on their own account. Parenthetically, they may on the other
hand sell the stock short at six times its liquidating value to some
of their less-well-trained brethren. Human nature sometimes
works that way—and, again, caveat emptor.
The signs of the times are that this condition must change.
Millions of disillusioned and impoverished investors are resolved
that they shall not again be bilked as they have been, and that the
Kreugers and Insulls of the future shall not have their funds
without submitting to real scrutiny and to real—that is, effective
—publicity. Financial writers in the metropolitan newspapers
are joining in the demand that auditors be no longer hired and
fired by management and therefore subject to its orders as to what
their reports shall or shall not contain, but that instead the audi364
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tors shall be elected by and be responsible only to the stock
holders.
Of course, this is only a manner of speaking. The stockholders,
as a body, are no more capable of selecting the auditors than they
are of managing the enterprise. Our English friends found that
out in their earlier practices. An auditor who offended the
management was replaced at the next meeting of the stock
holders, on the management’s ex-parte complaint that his reten
tion would not be for the good of the company. To remedy this
the English law was amended in two particulars: first, so that none
but the retiring auditor could be elected except after notice given
to the stockholders a week in advance of the meeting, and, second,
so that the auditor might appear at any stockholders’ meeting
to explain his report or to answer any questions which might be
put to him by the stockholders.
As to the first of these two provisions—namely, that none but
the retiring auditor may be elected—it seems to me that the
required time for notice should be no less than that required for
the general meeting of stockholders, in order to forestall the
issuance of proxies to representatives of management in ignorance
of the fact that so important a question is to be settled by vote.
Bearing in mind that the auditor is at first appointed as a matter
of law by the directors and as a matter of fact by the executive
officers, the provision seems to set up a barrier against the very
thing it tries to serve—namely, the free voice of the stockholders.
It tends to perpetuate the engagement of the auditor first chosen,
and, since his first appointment hinges on his acquaintance with
the management, the provision if adopted in this country might
lend unfortunate color to the charge of monopolistic tendencies in
our profession. Its advantage to the auditor is that it protects
him against a surplus attack and gives him an opportunity to
prepare a defense against any movement to dislodge him. It
seems to me that it would be well if the auditor were under the
necessity for being always so prepared.
As to the second provision—namely, that permitting the audi
tor to appear at stockholders’ meetings—I should go further and
make it mandatory for the auditor to appear at the annual meet
ings of both stockholders and directors, to address these meetings
on the subject of the accounts and to answer questions. On the
permissive basis, his appearance would be unusual, and therefore
management would be rather powerfully moved to avoid any such
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conflict with him as would justify him in exercising his privilege.
If his appearance were mandatory, although his weapon against
management would not be weakened, still in some circumstances
he might even be an ally of management against an unjustified
attack by mere malcontents.
Beyond this, however, I believe that personal contact by the
auditor with the directors and stockholders would change him in
their minds from a somewhat mythical to an entirely human
figure. He could and probably would discuss the company’s
affairs more intimately at such meetings than in a formal report
or in a certificate intended for publication. Incidentally, he
would be in position to make all parties concerned feel better
about his fee.
It has been said that the employment of auditors by the man
agement gives management the direct benefit of their technical
expertness, and that this benefit might be lost if the auditors were
elected by the stockholders. I believe that the English experi
ence nullifies this argument. As a matter of fact, in practice it is
the management which selects the auditor, and he is retained so
long as nothing develops to destroy the stockholders’ confidence
in him. But he knows at all times two things—first, that if he
permits management to manoeuvre him into a betrayal of the
confidence of stockholders he commits professional suicide; and,
second, that in any dispute with management he has the right to
appeal to the stockholders, so that management will not too long
maintain against him a position which it would find untenable at
a meeting of the stockholders. The result is that management
and auditor will compose their differences for the best interest of
ownership, and the full value of the auditor’s knowledge and skill
remains available for management in all its proper activities.
I can not leave the question of the best method of selection of
auditors with a discussion only of who should do the selecting.
After that question has been settled, as I think it must and will
ultimately be settled, in favor of election by the stockholders,
these parties are left in possession of a powerful instrument for
their own good but, if I may say so, with scant knowledge of how
to use it. What, then, is the best basis for selecting an auditor
from among those whose services are available?
From the very nature of the relationship, the auditor who bla
tantly offers himself, whether with eye-catching insertions in the
public prints, with self-laudatory circulars, or with direct personal366
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call solicitation, should be eliminated—and these comments apply,
of course, to the large organization as well as to the small firm or
individual practitioner. I deplore, and so I believe do many of
my friends who are partners in firms organized on a national or
international basis, the widespread belief that mere bigness stand
ing alone is evidence of special ability. The only matter of im
portance with regard to the size of the organization is that the
size of the organization is a matter of no importance, provided it
has the facilities necessary to the performance of the work con
templated. It has been well said that every organization is the
elongated shadow of one man, and it is the character of that man
rather than the length of the shadow which determines the
character of the organization.
The auditor elected by the stockholders should be known by
them to be thoroughly skilled in accounting, impregnably in
dependent and more than ordinarily courageous. These are
named in the order of the probable demand for them; otherwise
their importance is in the reverse order. Similarly on the sea, a
knowledge of navigation is used on every voyage, and is of course
always indispensable; but when the ship is damaged or when
storms arise there must be found also the utmost of resourceful
ness and courage. The time to make sure that these qualities
are present is before the vessel sails.
Stockholders should not delude themselves into thinking that
the enactment of a statute requiring an audit by an auditor re
sponsible directly to them will of itself give complete protection to
their investments. There are some things which a man must do
for himself, which none other can do for him; and eternal vigilance
is the price of financial safety no less than of political liberty.
There has been much discussion during the past few years as to
the form which auditors’ certificates should take. The question
seems to me very simple if viewed properly, and I believe much of
the discussion has been aimed really at the collateral question of
how much responsibility the certificate imposes on the auditor.
I submit that very little improvement can be made on the require
ments of the English statute in this respect.
Two features can, I think, be changed to advantage. In
England by statute, and in this country to a considerable extent
by custom, the balance-sheet to be submitted to stockholders is
prepared by the company’s own accounting staff, and the auditor
certifies his opinion as to its correctness. I submit that regard
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less of how the company may keep its accounts or prepare its
balance-sheet, it should be the privilege and the duty of the
auditor to prepare independently, and in such manner as to him
seems proper, the statements which are to go to the stockholders
over his name. To the question: “Whose balance-sheet is it?”
I would answer, “ It is the stockholders’ balance-sheet, and should
be prepared for their information by their own independent ac
countants possessed of all information necessary to that end.”
The second change is that the balance-sheet should be required to
be accompanied by reasonably detailed statements of the income
and surplus accounts—where we are is important, but how we got
there is no less so.
Paraphrasing the English act, then, I submit that the statute
should contain a provision requiring the auditors to state
(a) whether or not they have obtained all the information and
explanations they have required;
(b) that the accompanying financial statements have been pre
pared by them and in their opinion, when taken collec
tively, exhibit a correct view of the company’s financial
condition at a named date and of the changes therein for
a named period; and
(c) whether or not such statements are in agreement with the
company’s books,
together with adequate explanations in the event either (a) or (c)
is stated in the negative. There can be no question, as I see it, as
to the desirability of a statutory requirement that the auditor’s
certificate be brief, succinct and unequivocal.
Compulsory audit of corporations is being urged because losses
have been sustained by investors who have been uninformed with
regard to the manner in which their funds have been handled.
Change “uninformed” to “misinformed” and the reason appears
for the demand that corporation auditors be selected by the stock
holders and thereby freed from the domination of management.
Weasel words providing an escape from responsibility for state
ments technically correct but actually misleading have led to the
insistence that the responsibility of the auditor be fixed by re
quiring him to make his certificate a definite and unequivocal
statement with regard to the results of his work.
These reforms will come. They will lead to better conditions.
Let us work to prevent them from arousing false hopes and pre
cipitating further disappointments. After they shall have been
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accomplished in the best form obtainable, there still will rest on
our profession the burden of a very great responsibility. The
meeting of that responsibility is worthy of our best efforts; it will
be accomplished by an unswerving devotion to the ideal of hewing
to the line, letting the chips fall where they may.
I have taken much of your time. Alexander Pope said it all in
two lines:

“For forms of government let fools contest:
Whate’er is best administered is best.”
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